

Permission to Speak: A Novel Formal Foundation for Access Control

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Outline

- Motivation
 - Distributed, multi-authority access control
 - Compliance checking and blame assignment
- Formal representation
 - Delegation and obligation
 - Permission as provability
- Access control and conformance checking
 - System architecture
- Summary

Motivation and problem statement

- Main problem of access control:
 - Should a request for service be granted?
- In a distributed system with multiple authorities:
 - Which policies need to be consulted?
 - Which policies are violated and who is to blame?



Delegation and obligation

- “saying” is a common operator in access control logics
 - Captures both policy and credential introduction
 - Policies are typically obligations and credentials are typically permissions
 - Obligations and permissions are often implicit and must be deduced by the checker
- Explicit permissions and obligations
 - Deontic operators $P_A\phi$, $O_A\phi$

L_{PS} : logic and policies

- L_{PS} is a decidable logic with complete semantics
- Key formal device: axiom of representation

$$\left(\text{says}_{l(A)} \left(P_B \text{says}_{l(B)} \varphi \right) \wedge \text{says}_{l(B)} \varphi \right) \Rightarrow \text{says}_{l(A)} \varphi$$

- A policy is a collection of sequents

$$(id) \varphi \mapsto \psi$$

- True preconditions must have true postconditions
- Postconditions make more preconditions true

Contributions to science


- Uniform treatment of access control and conformance
 - Access control is verification of permissions
 - Conformance is satisfaction of obligations
 - Both are formalized as provability of statements in the logic
- Clarified semantics of deontic modalities
 - Nested permissions and obligations
 - Positive and negative permissions

Nested deontic modalities

- Parents (A) should not let their children (B) play by the road
 - Multiple possible interpretations:
 - A should not give B permission to play (positive permission)
 - A should tell B not to play (negative permission)
 - A should physically prevent B from playing
 - Each interpretation make sense in some context
- Alternation with saying solves the problem
 - “require to allow” becomes “require to make a rule...”
 - $O_A(\neg \text{says}_{I(A)} P_B \text{play}_{road}(B))$
 - $O_A(\text{says}_{I(A)} O_B \neg \text{play}_{road}(B))$

System architecture

- Principals introduce laws
- Logic programming engine computes *utterances*, ground saying terms
- Request is granted if utterances contain a permission for it



Future work: quantitative evaluation

- L_{PS} can be used as an alternative to Keynote in the QuanTM architecture
- A tighter integration with the reputation manager will be more efficient
- Quantitative semantics for L_{PS} will combine TDG construction and evaluation
 - Supported by the logic programming framework of L_{PS}
 - Similar to probabilistic Datalog semantics